INTRODUCTION
The creation of one internal market in which products may freely circulate has been central in the EU's integration project from its very start. Article 26(2) TFEU thus stipulates that this internal market will embrace 'an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured'. Over the years, this internal market has evolved on the basis of various features of different integration models such as host country control, home country control and harmonisation. 2 The latter relates particularly to the rules established with regard to the creation of the internal market. The attractiveness of harmonisation lies in the fact that EU rules can also take into account other interests than purely economic ones, such as the protection of human health and the environment, as is expressly stipulated in Article 114(3) TFEU. 3 Inevitably, however, there is a tension between harmonised rules and respect for diversity. In politically sensitive matters, it may therefore appear difficult to find a compromise and to adopt EU-wide measures. Moreover it may appear difficult within the internal market measures to offer the appropriate level of protection of, for example, environment and human health. 4 On the other hand, it is also true that the possibility for Member States to create and/or maintain diverse conditions has for a long time been part of the EU integration process. Accordingly, EU law provides for several mechanisms of legal differentiation and flexibility. These mechanisms allow Member States to derogate from the harmonised European rules under certain circumstances in order to respond to new health or environmental risks or other individual national or regional policy needs at the national level. Examples are the 'opt-out' clauses of Article 114(4) and (5) TFEU as well as various so-called 'safeguard clauses' laid down in EU secondary legislation in the fields of EU environmental and health and safety policy. 5 The use of these mechanisms by the Member States, however, has often created difficulties in the past as well as disagreement between the invoking Member State and the EU institutions with regard to the interpretation of the legal conditions and their fulfilment in each and every particular case. Especially in the field of consumer health and environmental protection, the bone of contention has often been the availability and interpretation of the scientific data with regard to the existence of health and environmental risks at the national level. Hence, the authority of scientific expertise in the use of legal differentiation mechanisms, together with the question in how far scientific evidence should be an exclusive factor in granting more regulatory flexibility at the national level, are key issues to be considered.
This contribution will take stock of these developments examining dynamics of legal differentiation in EU's internal market law in an empirically informed way. In particular, it will address the question in how far the actual use of the different available derogation mechanisms of Article 114 TFEU and secondary law safeguard clauses points to the existence of processes of differentiated integration or whether it triggers follow-up regulatory developments at the EU level. In other words, we aim to analyse whether, considering both the way EU law frames and approves of national derogation and safeguard clauses and the way scientific evidence is being used in this process, we can today observe a trend towards more harmonisation and less flexibility in the use of these mechanisms or whether, on the contrary, more legal differentiation is provided for. Before examining the current derogation practice under the mechanisms provided for in Article 114 TFEU and the safeguard clauses (sections 5 and 6), we will first discuss the origins of these mechanisms (section 2) and briefly delineate their requirements (sections 3 and 4).
INTERNAL MARKET LAW IN THE FACE OF DIVERSITY
Already at the end of the 1960s the EU envisaged the use of harmonisation to achieve its internal market ambition with the adoption of its harmonisation programme of 1969. 6 At the same time, it pursued the home country control model. Importantly, the This approach took mutual recognition as its main principle while identifying approximately 300 measures to be adopted in line with the harmonisation model, particularly on issues involving health and safety. Over the years, the Court had always been careful to avoid situations in which regulatory gaps would arise. It had been quite tolerant in allowing Member States, in line with the justification grounds of Article 36 TFEU, to derogate from the obligation to allow foreign products on their markets which would not conform to their own strict health and safety standards, particularly in cases of scientific uncertainty. This led to a surge of the host state control model in cases of health protection measures, which led in turn to situations of justified trade barriers blocking the free movement of products. resorting to harmonisation was indispensable.
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The introduction of a new Treaty provision, then Article 100A EEC, now Article 114 TFEU, allowed for internal market measures to be adopted by qualified majority voting and this was essential for the success of the 1985 New Approach. It was also clear that in order to get agreement on the introduction of qualified majority voting for internal market measures by the Single Act, Member States needed to be assured that they would not be outvoted on measures that would reduce existing levels of health and environmental protection. 11 In that manner, the former Article 100A(4), now Article 114(4 and 5) TFEU, provided for the possibility for Member States to opt out of harmonisation measures in order to adhere to stricter levels of protection.
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While some welcomed this provision as establishing, within the Treaty, the legitimate importance of national regulatory measures and the concept of shared competences, 13 others expressed their fears that opt-outs would damage the uniformity of the EU legal order and that it would compartmentalise the single market.
14 After the failure of the application of the mutual recognition principle in the manner the New Approach had envisaged, 15 the harmonisation model has become increasingly popular. Although the Single Act also embraced the concept of diversity in oth-er provisions, 16 for the purpose of this contribution we will look at the derogation mechanisms provided for in Article 114 TFEU to see how they have impacted the internal market.
17

DEROGATION THROUGH THE 'OPT-OUT' CLAUSES: ARTICLE
114(4) AND (5) TFEU
The anchoring of opt-out clauses in Article 114 TFEU seems to reflect a diversity principle even within harmonised areas of EU law, which therefore enjoy a constitutional status. As pointed out above, this mechanism was a political/strategic reply to Member States that were unwilling to reduce their health and safety protection levels within the EU framework. Opting out of harmonisation measures under Article 114 (4) and ( When a Member State is authorised to maintain or introduce derogating national provisions, the Commission must immediately examine whether the relevant harmonisation measure should be adapted accordingly (paragraph (7)). If the Commission or a Member State considers that another Member State is making improper use of this provision, it may bring the matter directly before the CJEU (paragraph (9)).
DEROGATION THROUGH THE 'OPT-OUT' CLAUSES: NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS, APPROVALS AND REJECTIONS
Overall we can conclude that the notification procedure is being interpreted strictly and is in fact 'narrowly construed'. 33 Our analysis of the derogation practice reveals a rather modest application of the derogation mechanisms. From 1987 until 2014, a total number of 34 derogations were sought by various Member States under both Article 114(4) and (5) TFEU (see Table 1 ). A close examination of the derogation requests reveals that there are considerable differences in the derogation practices under
Article 114 paragraphs 4 and 5. Until today, derogations under paragraph (4) were sought in 22 cases, 34 16 of which were approved by the Commission. Four notifications were rejected, one was withdrawn and one was declared inadmissible. In contrast, under Article 114(5), derogations were sought in 12 cases, only one of which was approved. Eight notifications were rejected, one was withdrawn and one was declared inadmissible. It shows that the Commission is more willing to approve preexisting measures than to allow for new measures to be introduced after harmonisa- 33 Case C-319/97 Kortas [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:272, para 23. 34 The three requests that were made under the old art 100A EEC also considered the requests to maintain legislation and therefore, for the purpose of our statistical analysis, we have added these three requests to the number of requests made under the new art 114(4) EEC post Amsterdam.
tion. Overall, our analysis reveals a varied picture in terms of the functioning of optouts as mechanisms of differentiation in EU internal market law. Importantly, in its decision making the Commission, following established EU case law, 35 has always stressed the necessity to interpret the legal requirements for derogation narrowly, given the exceptional nature of the opt-out clauses and the fact that they challenge the attainment of a fundamental Treaty objective, the integration of the market for goods.
The practice followed by both the Commission and the Court shows that derogation from EU harmonisation measures will not be permitted easily. 
The Netherlands Table 2 ) †Pending before Commission ‡ Case before CJEU related to the matter, but not seeking annulment of Commission Decision (See Table 2 
DEROGATION THROUGH THE 'OPT-OUT' CLAUSES IN PRAC-TICE: MAIN FINDINGS
Our findings reveal important insights into the way the derogation mechanisms under
Article 114 TFEU work. We would like to highlight six important findings of our analysis of the derogations practice in relation to i) the role of science, ii) the precautionary principle, iii) the relevance of international developments, iv) proportionality, v) burden of proof, and vi) the level of risk management. The consequences of the derogation mechanisms for the internal market as a whole will be discussed in section 7.
The Role of Science
The role that scientific evidence plays in the derogation procedure is crucial. As the 
The Precautionary Principle
Closely linked with the role of science is the application of the precautionary principle in the notification procedure. counterbalanced by its strict adherence to the burden of proof placed on that State.
The latter had to prove that the national provisions ensure a level of health protection which is higher than the EU harmonisation measure and that they do not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective. 65 In Toys, the General Court again emphasised the burden of proof on Germany that wished to maintain its existing legislation upholding stricter limits on values for lead, barium, arsenic, antimony, mercury, nitrosamines, and nitrosatable substances in toys. The Court ruled that Germany had failed to demonstrate that the national measure provided a higher level of protection than the EU harmonising measure and that it did so in a proportionate manner. In the Dutch emissions case, the Commission carried out a similar strict analysis.
Here it recognised the need for further reductions of emissions but emphasised the grave consequences for the vehicle manufacturers who would have to adapt their production or restrict the models on the Dutch market. 70 It concluded that the envisaged national measure was not the least restrictive to achieve the desired environmental and health protection and would constitute a disproportionate barrier to the functioning of the internal market. 71 Hence, in this case, the Commission gave more weight to the disruption of the internal market than the potential benefits of the measure. This suggests the application of the most onerous version of the proportionality principle. the end of 2015. 87 It is likely that after such a re-evaluation of these substances, the Commission will either adjust the EU legislation or ensure that the Danish provisions will be in line with the EU rules. Therefore, the Court's lenient ruling and the Commission's cooperative practice towards the Danish provisions on nitrates in meat seem to be rather an exception to the practice of derogations under Article 114 (4) and are rooted in the complexities and uncertainties as to the use of nitrates in meat. It seems therefore very likely that after 22 May 2018 --the date until which the Danish derogating provisions have been approved --and EFSA's opinion --due by the end of 2015--either the EU or Danish legislation will be amended.
EU RATHER THAN NATIONAL NORMS AND PROVISIONS
DIFFERENTIATION THROUGH SAFEGUARD CLAUSES
Article 114(10) and Safeguard Clauses in EU Legislation
In addition, the Treaty instructs the European institutions to provide for safeguard clauses in measures that deal with the protection of human health and safety and the environment. Member States may thus derogate from the obligation to ensure free movement of goods that comply with the rules laid down in EU harmonisation measures if a specific product legitimately produced in accordance with the EU rules causes a danger to inter alia human health or the environment. Thus paragraph (10) of Article 114 TFEU stipulates that harmonisation measures shall, in appropriate cases, include a safeguard clause which enables the Member States to take provisional measures for one or more of the non-economic reasons referred to in Article 34 TFEU, which are subjected to an EU control procedure. The safeguard clause requires Member States to notify the Commission of any stricter national provision they want to maintain or adopt and complements the notification procedures for non-(fully) harmonised areas. It aims to prevent dangerous products from circulating in the EU market. At the same time, the inclusion of safeguard measures reflects a recognition of the constitutional obligation of most Member
States to ensure the health and safety of their citizens. 89 Hence, where a Member State has good grounds for believing that a product which satisfies the requirements set out in a specific directive nonetheless poses a hazard to safety or health, it may temporarily prohibit this product or attach special conditions to its circulation. The final say in this procedure is left to the Commission together with a committee composed of national representatives. These cases generally lead the Commission to consider whether a revision of the relevant provisions in the harmonisation measure is necessary. Practice shows that also in situations where Member States rely on the safeguard clause, resort to science and reasoning in terms of science has become crucial. As will be discussed below (section 6.2.), in particular in relation to the authorisation of GMOs, comitology has given the Member States an instrument to enforce the maintenance of national derogations against the will of the Commission.
In addition, we also observe a recent trend of a disappearance of safeguard clauses from some of the EU food legislation. While this seems unconstitutional and in conflict with the rationale underlying Article 114 (10) 
GMOs
Our analysis reveals that it has appeared virtually impossible to find information on the use of safeguards, which has led us, for the time being, to limit our research to the food sector. Here it seems that relatively few derogations have been requested. 91 Most derogation requests concerned the notifications in the framework of the safeguards clauses laid down in the GMO Deliberate Release Directive 92 (13 notifications) .
These cases are exemplary in demonstrating the limits of scientific expertise when resolving politically sensitive regulatory issues. In the GMO case science, although frequently invoked by both Commission and Member States, has so far not been able to resolve the regulatory deadlock, 93 for which the EU was condemned by a WTO panel. 94 Rather, this deadlock led the Commission in 2010 to propose an amendment to the Deliberate Release Directive so as to include a new and highly unusual opt-out clause in this Directive. 95 After five years of discussion, the reform finally entered into force in April 2015. The amendment emphasises that the assessment of potential risks for human and animal health and the environment of the deliberate release of GMOs is fully harmonised. Therefore, the Member States should only use grounds related to environmental policy objectives which do not conflict with the EU assessment of risks.
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The rationale behind this framing is to grant the Member States more regulatory autonomy when it comes to GMO cultivation, but only for the purpose of responding to so-called 'other legitimate factors' involved in GMO cultivation. The EU centralised authorisation procedure with its harmonised risk assessment and EFSA's epistemic authority 100 ought to be preserved, however. This also shows that the persistent invocation of opt-out and safeguard clauses in the GMO case has not led to a differentiation in terms of different levels of public health and environmental protection across the Union (as was sometimes the case in other areas, see discussion above). In other words, it has not led to the acceptance by the EU, most notably the Commission, of scientific pluralism including different evaluations of scientific evidence on GMOs.
Instead, national bans and restrictions on GMOs have led to an opening up the 'scientific risk' framing of the GMO regulatory regime by providing the Member States with a legal basis to act upon other concerns surrounding the issue of GMO cultiva-99 See recitals (6) and (14) as an argument to approve the notification -only in accordance with the advice of EU scientific bodies, however. Another important factor of a successful notification seems to be whether a re-evaluation of a risk assessment with regard to a particular substance or product is already on-going at the EU level. Moreover, international developments and institutions provide an important context, which the Commission takes into account in its decisions. This was the case with the Kyoto Protocol in the fluorinated gases cases and with WHO guidelines in the short-chain chlorinated paraffins case. Finally, it can be noted that those cases in which derogations resulted in the adjustment of rules at the EU level were characterised by the fact that several (more than two) Member States filed a notification.
The modest application of the derogation possibilities under Article 114 (4) and (5) shows that the initial fears that the opt-out mechanism would lead to a fragmented internal market have not materialised. 103 Member States have only in a few cases enforced their national positions on health and safety issues notwithstanding a common approach adopted at EU level. And, of the 38 cases that were notified, 17 derogations were approved. Notably, in approximately 50% of the latter cases, the derogations 103 See e.g. Pescatore(n 14) .
have led to an adjustment of the EU framework to set a higher level of protection. In the other 50% of derogation approvals, the situation is less straightforward. In five cases the approval of derogations did not immediately lead to any further action at the EU level. The Danish provisions on nitrates in meat have been controlled by the Commission that renewed its approval of these derogation measures three times. As indicated above, currently EFSA will re-evaluate the use of these substances, which in all likelihood will subsequently lead to either an amendment of EU legislation or the discontinuation of the Danish derogation measures. The other four cases seem rather atypical cases of compliance with the Kyoto Protocol where the Commission did not submit the national derogation request for scientific review at the EU level but rather approved of the national derogation. In these cases, the derogation was approved for a limited period. Both new scientific insights at the EU and international level have led the Commission after 10 years to revise the relevant EU measures and to expand the restriction on the use of SCCPs. In the other cases, derogations were granted in the light of or until the completion of the revision of EU legislation. Hence, it seems that, where differentiation has been permitted by the Commission, the permission was of temporary nature until a revised EU framework would be established.
Therefore in the case of approved notifications, both Article 114 (4) and (5) seem to be an important mechanism of regulatory adjustment and learning in the fields of public health and environmental protection at the EU level. In some cases the successful invocation of an opt-out has ultimately triggered a process of further harmonisation at the EU level aiming to remove the regulatory disparities among the Member
States. In such cases the Commission was more tolerant to allow for a derogation especially in cases in which many Member States filed a notification to derogate from the same harmonisation measure, such as in case of PCP, creosote and cadmium, thus threatening the internal market laws on these substances. Hereby, it seems that it is not coincidental that the approval of the derogations resulted in the adjustment of the EU rules at the higher level of protection, pushed for by the derogating Member
States. The Commission's line of argumentation in these cases clearly shows the im-
portance of avoiding what is deems as unnecessary burdens on traders.
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Moreover, the emphasis on the relevance of choices made in other Member States refutes the logic of differentiation. Rather, a 'one size fits all' approach becomes apparent. Our study shows that the opt-out mechanism can be seen as failing to realise the promise of regulatory diversity and instead ultimately strengthens the uniformity of regulatory requirements in the EU internal market. Hence, the practice does not confirm the view that opt-out and safeguard clauses constitute a means of differentiated integration in EU internal market law. Rather they can be regarded as mechanisms increasing the uniformity of regulatory requirements in the EU internal market and thereby serving as means of further harmonisation. This happens mainly in two ways.
Firstly, the strict interpretation by both the Commission and EU Courts of the legal requirements for a Member State to invoke an opt-out or safeguard clause successfully prevents more frequent invocation of these derogation mechanisms. Secondly, where these mechanisms are actually being invoked successfully, this ultimately triggers a process of further harmonisation at the EU level to remove the regulatory disparities among the Member States. In these cases, the derogation clauses could be characterised as a kind of learning process indicating the need to provide other EU legal solutions and could act as a catalyst for better regulation and protection at the EU level. 105 The ultimate result, however, is a uniform EU framework rather than the acceptance of regulatory differences.
An example of this is the strengthening of the role of the European Commission as a central risk manager of crisis situations and emergencies with regard to food safety.
However, as the GMO case shows, persistent national derogations might also indicate the need to provide for more regulatory autonomy at the national level. The recent 'flexible approach' of the European Commission to GMO cultivation, which followed a yearlong national non-compliance with EU rules in this field, is a case in point. It exemplifies the tension between the creation of one internal market on which all products that conform to the EU rules may freely circulate on the one hand and the possibility and right of Member States to adhere to the values that they highly regard and wish to uphold on the other. The complexities of decision making on GMOs illustrate a strong reliance of the Commission on scientific expertise (also pushed by the WTO), which has been accompanied by a continuous 'battle of the experts.' 106 Persistent invocation of derogations by several Member States has in this case led to a new differentiated regulatory regime, as well as to the creation of a novel type of opt-out to be invoked on grounds other than public health and environmental safety. Consequently, GMO derogations have not led to a differentiation in terms of different levels of public health and environmental protection across the Union, given that the EUwide scientific assessment remains fully harmonised. Instead, they resulted in opening up the 'scientific risk' framing of the GMO regulatory regime by allowing the Mem- Lastly we need to reflect on what the low number of invocations of the opt-out clauses (and the safeguard clauses) really tells us. Does this mean that Member States are satisfied with the level of protection of the non-market values and that they feel no need to opt out of the general harmonisation schemes? This is not necessarily the case. First, the opt-out procedure is important in the negotiations of a harmonisation measure and gives Member States an important tool to push for a level of protection that is satisfactory to all Member States. In addition, analysis of the practice and case law on the opt-out procedures reveals that both the Commission and the Courts have an extremely rigid reading of the procedure while the grounds for invocation are very limited. As the GMO case exemplifies, this requires a rethinking of the ways in which the paradigm of uniformity may be combined with a respect for diversity, which eventually will impact on the implementation of international legal (trade) regimes.
This entails a profound reflection on what ultimately should be the inner soul of the internal market 107 and more generally of the EU.
